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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
DEBEVOISE, Senior District Judge. 
 
The trustee in bankruptcy of the Debtor, Susanne 
Gutpelet, objected to the Debtor's claimed exemption in 
money on deposit in two PNC Bank accounts, asserting 
that the money was the proceeds of real estate, the transfer 
of which was avoidable pursuant to the provisions of 11 
U.S.C. S 548(a). The bankruptcy court sustained the 
objection. On appeal the district court affirmed. For the 
reasons set forth below we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court. 
 
I. Background 
 
In 1987 the Debtor and her former husband, William 
Sutphen, were divorced. As part of the marital settlement 
the Debtor was obligated to pay Sutphen $125,000, which, 
together with interest, was due in July 1993. The Debtor 
received real estate which had previously been jointly 
owned. 
 
In 1990 the Debtor married Herbert Gutpelet ("Gutpelet"). 
At the time of their marriage Gutpelet owned in his own 
name real estate located at 1137 Evans Road in Lower 
Gwynedd Township, Pennsylvania (the "Evans Road 
Property"). By that time the Debtor had sold the real estate 
which she had received at the time of her divorce. She 
received approximately $170,000 net proceeds, which she 
placed in The Marian State Bank ("the Marian Bank"). It 
was used to collateralize Gutpelet's indebtedness to the 
bank and the bank ultimately applied it in payment of 
Gutpelet's obligations. 
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Gutpelet was deeply in debt in 1992 and 1993, and 
various liens had attached to the Evans Road Property, 
including a mortgage held by the Marian Bank. 
 
On October 18, 1993 Gutpelet transferred title to the 
Evans Road Property to the Debtor. The Debtor testified 
that she paid no consideration for the property and that the 
purpose of the transfer was to enable her to obtain a home 
equity loan in order to pay Gutpelet's creditors. Gutpelet 
believed that he was not credit worthy and that he could 
not obtain a loan in his own name. 
 
On February 24, 1994 the Gutpelets obtained a loan from 
Equity One Incorporated ("Equity One") in the approximate 
amount of $500,000. They each executed the note and 
mortgage. After payments were made to Gutpelet's creditors 
the net proceeds of approximately $128,000 were deposited 
in a joint bank account at PNC Bank. 
 
On March 4, 1994 the Debtor executed a deed 
transferring title to the Evans Road Property from herself to 
"Susanne B. Gutpelet and Herbert J. Gutpelet, her 
husband." On September 1, 1994 the Debtor and Gutpelet 
sold the Evans Road Property for a sales price of $800,000. 
Most of the sale proceeds were used to pay off debts, 
including the Equity One refinancing loan. The net 
proceeds of the sale of the Evans Road Property, 
approximately $158,500, were deposited in a joint account 
at PNC Bank. 
 
Not all of the proceeds realized from the equity loan and 
from the sale of the Evans Road Property were used to pay 
Gutpelet's debts. Some were used to pay the Debtor's living 
expenses; a part was used to purchase a sewing business 
in Costa Rica to provide income for the Debtor; she loaned 
$6,500 to her sister-in-law; she repaid $34,500 which she 
had borrowed from friends. 
 
On October 27, 1994 the Debtor filed a petition for relief 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 101, 
et seq. Her indebtedness for principal and interest to her 
former husband amounted at that time to $206,308, about 
95% of her total indebtedness. Amended schedulesfiled on 
June 20, 1995 disclosed the existence of an account in 
Corestates Bank and two accounts in PNC Bank. None of 
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these accounts had been disclosed in the Debtor's original 
schedules. The PNC Bank accounts contained the balance 
of the proceeds of the sale of the Evans Road Property. 
 
The Debtor claimed an exemption of all three accounts 
under 11 U.S.C. S 522(b)(2) and applicable Pennsylvania 
law. The Trustee filed an objection to the exemption of the 
PNC Bank accounts, asserting that the March 4, 1994 
transfer of the Evans Road Property was an avoidable 
transfer under 11 U.S.C. S 548(a), and therefore the 
proceeds of its sale were the property of the Debtor's estate.1 
The bankruptcy court sustained the Trustee's objection. 
The district court affirmed, and this appeal followed. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
Jurisdiction in the bankruptcy court was proper under 
28 U.S.C. S 157(a). The district court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 158(a). This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal of the district court's judgment under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(d). 
 
The bankruptcy court's legal interpretations are subject 
to plenary review; the factual findings of the bankruptcy 
court are reviewed for clear error. Since we are in as good 
a position to review the bankruptcy court's decision as the 
district court was, we will review the bankruptcy court's 
findings by the standards the district court would apply. 
Zolfo, Cooper & Co. v. Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc., 50 F.3d 253, 
257 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
The Debtor's exemption claim is based upon 11 U.S.C. 
S 522(b)(2)(B) which provides that an individual debtor may 
exempt from property of the estate "any interest in property 
in which the debtor had, immediately before the 
commencement of the case, an interest as tenant by the 
entirety or joint tenant to the extent that such interest as 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Trustee also objected to the exemption for all three banks 
accounts on the ground that the Debtor was precluded from exempting 
those moneys pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 522(g), because she intentionally 
concealed the existence of the accounts. The bankruptcy court ruled 
against the Trustee on that objection, and the Trustee has not appealed 
that ruling. 
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a tenant by the entirety or joint tenant is exempt from 
process under applicable nonbankruptcy law." The Debtor 
notes that under Pennsylvania law property which is held 
as tenants by the entirety, whether real property or 
personal property, is exempt from process. In re Balber, 112 
B.R. 6 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990). The funds in the two joint 
accounts at PNC Bank were the proceeds of the sale of the 
Evans Road Property which had been held by the Debtor 
and her husband as tenants by the entirety since the 
March 4, 1994 transfer. Therefore, the Debtor contends, the 
funds were immune from process under Pennsylvania law 
and are exempt under S 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
 
The Trustee asserted before the bankruptcy court that 
the March 4, 1994 transfer was avoidable under S 548(a)(2) 
which provides: 
 
       (a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of 
       the debtor in property, or any obligation incurred by 
       the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one 
       year before the date of the filing of the petition, if the 
       debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-- 
 
       . . . 
 
       (2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value 
       in exchange for such transfer or obligation; and (B)(i) 
       was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made 
       or such obligation was incurred, or became insolvent 
       as a result of such transfer or obligation. 
 
Thus to avoid a transfer under S 548(a)(2) the Trustee must 
establish that: (1) the Debtor had an interest in the 
property; (2) the interest was transferred within one year of 
the filing of the bankruptcy petition; (3) the Debtor was 
insolvent at the time of the transfer or became insolvent as 
a result thereof; and (4) the Debtor received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer. 
BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 535, reh'g 
denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994). 
 
The bankruptcy court found, and it is undisputed, that 
the Trustee established elements 2, 3 and 4 of an avoidable 
transfer. The disputed issue was whether the Debtor had 
an "interest" in the Evans Road Property. The Debtor 
 
                                5 
  
advances two theories to support her contention that she 
did not have an interest in the property even though for five 
months she held legal title. First, she contends that she 
paid no consideration for the transfer from Gutpelet to 
herself and therefore had no interest. Second, she contends 
that "the two transfers should be viewed as two indivisible 
parts of one integrated transaction in which the Evans 
Road Property was essentially converted by Mr. Gutpelet 
from solely owned property directly to entireties property." 
(Debtor's Brief at 18.) 
 
The bankruptcy court found that the Debtor's 
involvement in the entire chain of transactions constituted 
consideration for the transfer to her. These transactions, 
from the October 18, 1993 transfer of the Evans Road 
Property to the Debtor until the deposit of the balance of 
the $800,000 proceeds of its sale in a joint bank account, 
involved mutual benefits and burdens as between the 
Debtor and Gutpelet. He was able to repay his debts. She 
was able to repay certain of her debts and acquire the 
Costa Rica business. 
 
It is unnecessary, however, to find consideration in order 
to conclude that the Debtor acquired an interest in the 
Evans Road Property for S 548(a)(2) purposes. Her extended 
and extensive dealings with the real estate were sufficient 
to establish such an interest. 
 
The district court dealt with the Debtor's alternative 
theory, namely, that Gutpelet's transfer of title to the 
Debtor and the Debtor's transfer of title to herself and 
Gutpelet should be viewed as a single transfer of title from 
Gutpelet to himself and his wife as tenants by the entirety. 
If that concept were accepted the Debtor never possessed 
an interest in the Evans Road Property and the first 
requirement to avoid the transfer would not be met. 
 
There can be no doubt that the Debtor had legal title to 
the Evans Road Property from October 1993 until March 
1994. She argues, however, that the bankruptcy court 
should have looked beyond the bare passage of title to the 
reality of the transactions in their entirety, finding that the 
Debtor did not have the requisite control over the Evans 
Road Property to give her an "interest" in the property. The 
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Debtor relies upon In Re Chase & Sanborn Corp., 813 F.2d 
1177 (11th Cir. 1987). 
 
In that case a person referred to as Duque caused 
$660,000 to be transferred to an account of the debtor, 
Chase & Sanborn. Of this amount $350,000 was 
gratuitously transferred to Duque's secretary who used it 
and other funds to pay a bank loan upon which Duque was 
obligated. The Chase & Sanborn account was opened days 
before it received the $660,000 and closed days after the 
$350,000 payment. Thereafter Chase & Sanborn filed a 
petition under Chapter 11. The Trustee sought to avoid the 
transfer under S 548. The Court of Appeals held that 
"[a]lthough the debtor corporation had possession of the 
funds in controversy by virtue of the transfer to the 
account, the record demonstrates that the debtor 
corporation did not have sufficient control over the funds to 
warrant a finding that the funds were the debtor 
corporation's property." Id. at 1180. 
 
In Chase & Sanborn the court stated that "[i]n 
determining whether the debtor had control of funds 
transferred to a non-creditor, the court must look beyond 
the particular transfers in question to the entire 
circumstance of the transactions." Id. at 1181-82. The 
court found that the Chase & Sanborn account was a mere 
conduit of funds from and to other parties; that "the actual 
connection between the funds and the debtor was quite 
tangential: a two-day layover in a special account then only 
recently opened and soon thereafter closed." Id. at 1182. 
 
These circumstances are totally different from the 
circumstances of the present case. The connection between 
the Evans Road Property and the Debtor was hardly 
tangential. She held title to it for five months and during 
that time she joined in mortgaging it and later transferring 
it to herself and her husband. She contends that she was 
nothing but a passive tool of her husband who exercised 
total control, but the findings of the bankruptcy court 
negating such a limited role are amply supported by the 
record. 
 
Matter of Zedda, 103 F.3d 1195 (5th Cir. 1997) does not 
require a different result. There the Court considered a pre- 
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petition transfer of real estate to the debtor for the sole 
purpose of enabling her to obtain a loan secured by the real 
estate. Four years later the transferrer-debtor executed and 
there was recorded a "counter letter" which recited that (i) 
by virtue of the deed she had acquired record title to the 
property; (ii) record title had been placed in her name for 
convenience only; (iii) the property actually belonged to 
another person; (iv) she had paid no cash consideration for 
the property and (v) the other person had made all the 
monthly mortgage payments. Four months later the debtor 
deeded the property back to the original owner and recited 
in an addendum to the deed the essential facts set forth in 
the counter letter. Within a year after the last transfer the 
debtor filed her petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. The trustee challenged the re-transfer of 
the property in part on S 548(a)(2) grounds. The Court of 
Appeals held that the debtor did not have an interest in the 
property and rejected the trustee's challenge. 
 
The circumstances of the original transfer to the debtor 
in Zedda were significantly different from the circumstances 
in the present case. More important, in Zedda the court 
noted that whether the debtor had an interest in property 
was a question of state law, and held that under applicable 
Louisiana law the original deed, as characterized in 
subsequent instruments, was a "simulation" which did not 
actually transfer ownership of the property. Id. at 1204. 
The facts and the applicable law differ in the present case. 
 
We conclude that the bankruptcy court's finding that the 
Debtor had an interest in the Evans Road Property and that 
the Trustee established each of the other requirements to 
avoid the March 4, 1994 transfer of that property was not 
clearly erroneous. Therefore the bankruptcy court properly 
sustained the Trustee's objection to the Debtor's claimed 
exemption in the two PNC Bank accounts. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
We will affirm the January 27, 1997 order of the district 
court, which affirmed the February 20, 1996 order of the 
bankruptcy court. 
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